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ABSTRACT
Censorship-circumvention tools are in an arms race against
censors. The censors study all traffic passing into and out
of their controlled sphere, and try to disable censorship-
circumvention tools without completely shutting down the
Internet. Tools aim to shape their traffic patterns to match
unblocked programs, so that simple traffic profiling cannot
identify the tools within a reasonable number of traces; the
censors respond by deploying firewalls with increasingly so-
phisticated deep-packet inspection.
Cryptography hides patterns in user data but does not
evade censorship if the censor can recognize patterns in the
cryptography itself. In particular, elliptic-curve cryptogra-
phy often transmits points on known elliptic curves, and
those points are easily distinguishable from uniform random
strings of bits.
This paper introduces high-security high-speed elliptic-
curve systems in which elliptic-curve points are encoded so
as to be indistinguishable from uniform random strings.
1. INTRODUCTION
Elliptic-curve cryptography (ECC) is arguably the most
important tool in modern public-key cryptography. It pro-
vides public-key signatures, public-key encryption, non-
interactive key exchange, and many higher-level security fea-
tures. It offers an attractive combination of high security,
high speed, and (often critical for deployment) small space
consumption.
However, for applications in censorship circumvention,
ECC has a security problem. ECC protocols naturally send
elliptic-curve points in the clear as long-term public keys,
ephemeral public keys, ciphertext prefixes, challenges, etc.
These points, even in compressed form, are obvious: they
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are easy to distinguish from uniform random strings.
There have been some ad-hoc workarounds for this prob-
lem, notably for ElGamal ciphertext prefixes, using a curve-
or-twist technique introduced by Mo¨ller (see below). But
each new ECC-based protocol faces the same problem. Pro-
tocol designers unaware of the issue continue building proto-
cols that are trivially visible to attackers. Designers requir-
ing keys and ciphertexts to be indistinguishable from ran-
dom are forced to modify those protocols, hoping that the
modifications do not compromise other forms of security.
The main goal of this paper is to eliminate this prob-
lem. The solution presented here works for a wide range of
elliptic-curve protocols, essentially every protocol in which
the transmitted curve points are generated at random.
There is no longer any need for, e.g., ad-hoc handling of
ciphertext prefixes; this paper’s technique works for all of
the types of elliptic-curve points mentioned above.
1.1 Distinguishers
We use the standard NIST P-256 elliptic curve as an ex-
ample to illustrate the difficulties. A public key on the
NIST P-256 elliptic curve is a pair (x, y) of integers sat-
isfying the equation y2 = x3 − 3x + b modulo the prime
2256 − 2224 + 2192 + 296 − 1, where b is a standard constant.
There are at least three obvious ways for an attacker to dis-
tinguish this public key from a uniform random string:
• Least severe: Normally x and y are represented as
integers between 0 and 2256 − 2224 + 2192 + 296 − 2
inclusive, encoded as 256-bit strings. If the attacker
sees a 256-bit string representing an integer larger than
2256 − 2224 + 2192 + 296 − 2 then the attacker knows
that the string is not a valid value of x or of y. If the
attacker sees a user sending a series of (e.g.) 235 256-
bit strings, and the largest string is close to 2256−2224,
then the attacker is reasonably confident that the user
is sending elliptic-curve points.
One can dismiss this attack as being too slow to be
of interest, but we prefer more robust cryptographic
primitives that maintain security with heavy use. The
user can cover all integers between 0 and 2256 − 1 by
randomizing the representations of small integers x
and y, but this adds very little security: the attacker
easily collects statistics showing that some integers ap-
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pear half as often as others.
A secure solution is to randomly represent x and y as
integers between 0 and, e.g., 2320 − 1. Another secure
solution, with smaller keys, is to switch to an elliptic
curve using a prime much closer to a power of 2, such as
NIST P-224 (prime 2224−296 +1, lower security level)
or Bernstein’s Curve25519 from [4] (prime 2255 − 19).
• More severe: The attacker simply checks the curve
equation. If a 512-bit string has the form (x, y) where
y2 = x3 − 3x+ b modulo this prime then the attacker
is confident that the user is sending a public key.
Many ECC systems save space by compressing y to
a single (random-looking) bit, namely the sign in
±√x3 − 3x+ b. Some ECC systems save space by
eliminating y entirely. The cost for the legitimate
user of computing a square root is almost always out-
weighed by the benefit of reducing keys to half size.
Both of these mechanisms have the side effect of stop-
ping this attack.
• Most severe: The attacker checks whether x3 − 3x+ b
is a square modulo this prime. This has chance 1/2 of
occurring for a uniform random string, but if it occurs
repeatedly then the attacker is reasonably confident
that the user is sending public keys.
The third attack is quite difficult to stop. Our solution re-
quires a quite drastic change in how curve points are rep-
resented as strings; this representation is the main topic of
this paper.
Our solution is not limited to public keys: it also protects
other randomly generated elliptic-curve points, such as the
points appearing in ciphertexts in elliptic-curve versions of
the ElGamal encryption system and points appearing in sig-
nature systems. See Section 2.
1.2 Previous work
Several years ago, in [35], Mo¨ller proposed a variant of the
ElGamal encryption system that provides indistinguishabil-
ity for ciphertexts as follows:
• Alice’s public key is a pair (aP, a′P ′) where a and a′
are secret integers, P is a standard base point on an
elliptic curve E(F2n) over some binary field F2n , and
P ′ is a standard base point on a nontrivial quadratic
twist E′(F2n) of the same curve.
• To encrypt a message m using public key (aP, a′P ′),
Bob chooses a random integer b, chooses randomly be-
tween aP and a′P ′, sends the x-coordinate of bP or
bP ′ respectively, hashes b(aP ) or b(a′P ′) respectively
to obtain a secret key, and sends an encryption of m
using this secret key.
• Alice recovers bP or bP ′ from the x-coordinate. Alice
multiplies bP or bP ′ by a or a′ to obtain abP or a′bP ′,
hashes it to obtain the same secret key, and decrypts
the message. Mo¨ller requires Alice to perform tests to
decide whether the input is on E or on E′ and to re-
cover the whole point bP or bP ′ . We comment that
the “Montgomery ladder” handles both cases together
if a′ is chosen as a. (For background on the Mont-
gomery ladder see [36], [13], and, for the binary case,
[34].) This eliminates the need for such tests and offers
efficient curve arithmetic.
The idea in Mo¨ller’s proposal is that each element of F2n
is a valid x-coordinate on E or its twist. The x-coordinate
transmitted here can therefore be any element of F2n , and in
fact the distribution of the x-coordinates is indistinguishable
from the uniform distribution of strings of length n. Mo¨ller
slightly adjusts the choices so that the distribution is exactly
uniform.
Our approach encodes points on a single curve as strings
indistinguishable from uniform random strings. This has
several obvious advantages over Mo¨ller’s system. We ob-
tain indistinguishability not just for ciphertexts but also for
public keys. Mo¨ller’s system has double-length public keys,
while our public keys have minimal length. Mo¨ller’s ap-
proach is limited to ElGamal encryption, while our approach
handles a much wider range of ECC systems; see Section 2.
Mo¨ller needs cryptographic security not just for E but also
for E′; in our system twist security is not required, although
we still suggest it as a desirable feature (see Section 4). Fi-
nally, Mo¨ller describes his system only for curves over binary
fields F2n , which are not as confidence-inspiring as curves
over prime fields; see Section 4.
1.3 Application context
Mo¨ller’s curve-or-twist approach is used in StegoTorus
[42]. StegoTorus is an extension to Tor [16] for censorship
circumvention. It makes Tor traffic resemble Skype, general
HTTPS traffic, etc. and relies on secure communication with
a StegoTorus server. Establishing a link with this server re-
quires deriving temporary key material using the public key
of the server. This key material is used to encrypt com-
munication of a subsequent ephemeral DH key exchange.
StegoTorus uses Mo¨ller’s example parameters over F2163 .
For comparison, typical ECC protocols carry out a DH
key exchange in the clear; see, e.g., the ntor example below.
StegoTorus needs to encrypt its key exchange because the
points sent in the key exchange are easily distinguishable
from random data. This encryption adds the outer Mo¨ller
layer, doubling the space used for the initial communication.
This also slows down the client, slows down the server, dou-
bles the size of server public keys (one point on the curve,
one point on the twist), and requires implementations to
handle computations on two curves.
We eliminate all of these issues by solving the underlying
problem, namely the point distinguishability. The points
that we send in a DH key exchange are indistinguishable
from uniform random strings. See Sections 2 and 3.
Telex [43] is another censorship-circumvention tool. Telex
messages pose as regular TLS messages to random uncen-
sored sites; the only difference is that the nonce field contains
a cryptographic value instead of a random value. The public
key of the Telex server is a pair of points (aP, aP ′), with P
on an elliptic curve E(Fq) and P
′ on a nontrivial quadratic
twist. Telex servers use deep-packet inspection on all traffic
passing through them and identify Telex messages by check-
ing whether the nonce field interpreted as α||β satisfies the
following conditions. Interpret α as the x-coordinate of a
point R on E or E′ and compute aR on the appropriate
curve. Identify the message as a Telex message if β matches
a salted hash of aR, and route it according to some other,
encrypted information.
The use of curves in Telex follows Mo¨ller’s proposal except
for the choice of finite field and the choice of equal secrets.
The proposed parameters have q = 2168 − 28 − 1 so that
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the distribution of values in Fq is indistinguishable from
that of length-168 strings. The attempted decryption per-
forms a complete point recovery from x and uses standard
Weierstrass-curve arithmetic to compute the scalar multipli-
cations. We comment again that the “Montgomery ladder”
is more efficient, handling both cases together. We also com-
ment that the system could use somewhat larger finite fields,
gaining security, without reducing the 56-bit hash size and
without going beyond the standard TLS 224-bit nonce size:
servers would allow only points R with a fixed number of
implicit trailing zeros, and clients would repeatedly gener-
ate points until meeting that condition.
This paper’s solution to the point-distinguishability prob-
lem would not save bandwidth for Telex connections but
would still simplify implementations, removing any need to
handle the twist, and would reduce public keys to half size,
potentially a useful feature for small clients keeping track of
many different Telex servers.
As a third protocol we consider ntor [27], a handshake
protocol proposed for Tor achieving anonymity and one-way
authentication with forward secrecy. This protocol assumes
that Tor relays have public keys on an elliptic curve. The
following is a simplified version of the ntor protocol, skip-
ping certificates and saved session states, but presenting
all parts relevant to the choice of curve group and repre-
sentation. To extend a Tor circuit to a relay with pub-
lic key B = bP a client picks a random value x, com-
putes X = xP , and sends X to the server. The server
picks a random y, computes Y = yP , computes two se-
cret keys as k′||k = H(yX, bX,B,X, Y ) for some hash func-
tion H, computes tB = MACk′(B,X, Y ) (an authentica-
tor under key k′), and sends Y ||tB to the client. The
client computes k¯′||k¯ = H(xY, xB,B,X, Y ) and verifies that
tB = MACk¯′(B,X, Y ). If the verification is successful, the
client is convinced that it is communicating with the correct
server: nobody other than the client and the relay could
compute xB = bX. Both sides can use k = k¯ for transmit-
ting encrypted messages.
Tor currently uses SSL links to superencrypt its traffic.
However, one can easily imagine the same ntor protocol be-
ing steganographically encoded inside a cover channel, with
the goal of circumventing censorship, on top of the original
goals of anonymity, one-way authentication, and forward
secrecy. This raises the question of how the elliptic-curve
points can be hidden. Using a pair of points xP, xP ′ in
place of X does not work: it is even easier to distinguish
from random than a single point. Mo¨ller’s curve-or-twist
approach, using a pair of points in place of the server’s long-
term key B, also does not work: the client is free to pick X
on the curve or the twist, but the server is then forced to
pick Y on the same curve as X, and this is something visible
to a censor.
Our solution applies straightforwardly to this protocol. It
does not need twists: it ensures that the encodings of points
on a single curve are uniformly distributed. More generally,
our solution can be used to encode as many points as desired
during one session or across sessions.
1.4 Mapping strings to elliptic-curve points
Shallue and van de Woestijne at ANTS 2006 [40] gave a
positive answer to the following question in pure algorith-
mic number theory: there is, provably, a (very easy) prob-
abilistic polynomial-time algorithm that, given any elliptic
curve E over any sufficiently large finite field Fq, constructs
a nonzero element of the group E(Fq); is there, provably, a
deterministic polynomial-time algorithm for the same task?
Shallue and van de Woestijne did more than construct a sin-
gle point: they built a function φ : Fq → E(Fq) such that
each element of E(Fq) has at most C preimages, for a partic-
ular constant C; and they built a deterministic polynomial-
time algorithm that computes φ(t) given q, E, and t. Trying
C + 1 elements of Fq then produces a nonzero element of
E(Fq).
Some cryptographic protocols rely on hashing strings to
curve points. For example, in the Boneh–Franklin identity-
based encryption scheme [10], public keys are points on
pairing-friendly curves, and a user with identity i has public
key H(i). Boneh and Franklin constructed a suitable func-
tionH for certain supersingular curves. Icart at Crypto 2009
[29] pointed out that the Shallue–van de Woestijne function
φ produced suitable functions H for any elliptic curve, al-
lowing the Boneh–Franklin system to be adapted to much
more efficient non-supersingular (but still pairing-friendly)
curves. Icart and subsequent authors explored various re-
placements φ for the Shallue–van de Woestijne function; see
[29], [12], [23], [22], [17], [24], [20], and [18].
The reader should be wondering why one cannot simply
define φ(t) by trying consecutive field elements x starting
from t (for example, trying x = t, x = t + 1, x = t +
2, etc. in the prime-field case) until finding a curve point
(x, y). The answer for Shallue and van de Woestijne is that
this is not proven to take polynomial time. On the other
hand, there is overwhelming evidence for the conjecture that
this takes polynomial time, and in cryptography there is no
harm in making such a conjecture; cryptography is built on
a foundation of conjectures that are much easier to question,
such as the conjecture that there is no fast ECDL algorithm.
This simple function from Fq to E(Fq) is exactly what is
used in many papers on identity-based cryptography.
The real objection to this algorithm is that it does not take
constant time. In many applications the time leaks secret
information. One can compute the same function for almost
all inputs in constant time by choosing an upper bound C
on the number of consecutive field elements required with
very high probability, say C = 100, and then always test
exactly C values of x; but testing C times for squares turns
out to be a serious performance problem.
It should be obvious that any of the functions φ men-
tioned above allows a public key φ(t) ∈ E(Fq) to be rep-
resented as an element t ∈ Fq, using a computation of
Q 7→ {t : φ(t) = Q} to encode a point and a computation of
t 7→ φ(t) to decode a point. However, this approach raises
several important performance issues for key generation:
• The usual key-generation method produces a uniform
random curve point by scalar multiplication, but there
is no reason to think that this curve point can be ex-
pressed in the form φ(t). If it cannot then the user
must try again, generating a new key.
• Even worse, to generate a uniform distribution of el-
ements t ∈ Fq the user must generate a uniform
random curve point Q, compute the number k =
#{t : φ(t) = Q} of preimages of the point, restart with
probability 1 − k/C, and finally select a uniform ran-
dom preimage of the point. (This is what statisti-
cians call “rejection sampling”; more advanced sam-
3
pling methods are inapplicable since there is no way to
generate a uniform random curve point with a specified
value of k.) The average number of points generated
is then C#E(Fq)/q ≈ C. One must budget for even
more repetitions in applications that need real-time
guarantees.
• Each of these C points takes time not just for the
computation of Q but also for the computation of
{t : φ(t) = Q}. This is the main bottleneck if φ is slow
to invert.
In many protocols, ephemeral ECC keys are generated for
every protocol run, and these computations can easily dom-
inate the overall protocol performance. Of course, even in
protocols where key generation is rare, each use of t incurs
the cost of computing φ(t).
We minimize these performance problems by taking an
encoding function φ that is implicit in the very recent paper
[20] by Fouque, Joux, and Tibouchi. This function, in the
cases we consider, maps {0, 1, 2, 3, . . . , (q − 1)/2} injectively
to E(Fq); see Theorem 4. Since the number of points on E
over Fq is about q we have to try only about 2 points on
average before finding a point of the form φ(t), and we do not
need to randomize the preimage t. Not every elliptic curve
is suitable for this function, but the curve requirements in
this paper are compatible with state-of-the-art criteria for
curve security and curve performance.
Fouque, Joux, and Tibouchi suggested that injectivity
would be useful for a naive form of ElGamal encryption
in which a message m is encoded injectively as an elliptic-
curve point and then simply added to abP . We highlight the
new anti-censorship application, namely encoding points as
strings rather than encoding strings as points; we drastically
simplify the definition of this function, while accelerating its
forward and inverse computation; and we introduce a high-
security high-speed elliptic curve that supports the function.
See Section 4 for the curve, Section 3 for the function, and
Section 2 for the cryptographic applications.
2. ELLIPTIC-CURVE PROTOCOLS
This section presents various elliptic-curve protocols in
which public keys, ciphertexts, etc. are indistinguishable
from uniform random strings. These protocols include all of
the fundamental ECC constructions: static and ephemeral
key exchange, encryption, and signatures.
The prerequisite for all of these protocols is an injective
map ι from a set of strings S ⊆ {0, 1}b to an elliptic-curve
group E(Fq). We require #S to be extremely close to 2
b,
so that a uniform random element of S is indistinguishable
from a uniform random b-bit string. Section 3 explains how
to construct ι and S for a broad class of elliptic curves;
Section 4 presents a specific elliptic curve that supports the
construction.
The idea, as explained in Section 1, is for each string τ ∈ S
to represent the elliptic-curve point ι(τ), i.e., for the point
ι(τ) to be encoded as the string τ . A uniform random ele-
ment of ι(S), encoded in this way, is indistinguishable from
a uniform random b-bit string. We do not require ι(S) to be
all of E(Fq); our protocols compensate for this by repeat-
edly generating curve points until finding elements of ι(S).
For our construction #ι(S) is about (1/2)#E(Fq), so only
about 2 repetitions are required on average, as mentioned in
Section 1.
Our primary objective in this section is to illustrate how
easily ι can be used to systematically hide elliptic-curve
points in a wide range of protocols. We do not mean to
suggest that all of these protocols are being used in contexts
where they need to be hidden from censors; but there is no
obvious dividing line between protocols that would be useful
for those contexts and protocols that would not.
Consider, for example, static ECDH public keys. A static
public key might be distributed openly, as part of a crypto-
graphic software package, in which case it does not add any
new risk of censorship; changing the encoding of the public
key does nothing to hide the package from a censor. On
the other hand, if a client already has all necessary crypto-
graphic software, and a server broadcasts a series of static
public keys by encoding those keys inside otherwise inno-
cent web pages or other cover traffic, then indistinguishabil-
ity from random is exactly the tool needed to defend those
public keys against a censor with an accurate model of the
cover traffic. A censored Tor client should be able to see fre-
quent updates of public keys for Tor bridges, for example;
see [1] for a detailed discussion of the speed at which various
governments detect and suppress access to Tor bridges.
2.1 Notation and domain parameters
To simplify the protocol statements we assume that the
elliptic-curve group E(Fq) is cyclic: specifically, that it is
generated by a standard base point P of order n. In the
case that n is not prime (for example, n is 4 times a prime
in Section 4) we do not restrict points to a prime-order sub-
group: any proper subgroup is trivially distinguishable from
the full group. For non-cyclic groups the protocols would
have to be modified to handle multiple generators.
Let H denote a hash function, and let || denote concate-
nation of strings. Symmetric authenticated encryption of a
message M using a secret key k is denoted as c = Enck(m),
decryption as m = Deck(c). A standard security require-
ment for symmetric encryption is that the ciphertexts are
indistinguishable from random (see, e.g., [3]); one can, for
example, safely use AES in counter mode. For authentica-
tion there is a split in the literature between authenticators
aiming at the “PRF” property, which guarantees indistin-
guishability, and authenticators aiming merely at the“MAC”
property, which guarantees unforgeability but does not guar-
antee indistinguishability; we require the PRF property. See
[39] for a unified security notion for authenticated encryp-
tion that guarantees indistinguishability from random bit
strings.
2.2 Long-term Diffie–Hellman keys
Each user U sets up a public key:
1. U generates a random integer u.
2. U computes PU = uP . If PU /∈ ι(S) then U repeats
from step 1.
3. U publishes ι−1(PU ) = τU and keeps u secret.
The encoding τU of the public key is a string which can be
broadcast; it is indistinguishable from a random string.
Without further communication users Alice and Bob can
compute a shared secret from their public strings τA and
τB . Alice can compute this key as follows and then use it to
authenticate and encrypt a message to Bob:
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1. Alice computes ι(τB) = PB .
2. Alice computes k = H(uAPB).
Upon receiving an encrypted message from Alice, Bob can
likewise compute the same shared secret and then decrypt
the message and verify the authenticator:
1. Bob computes ι(τA) = PA.
2. Bob computes k = H(uBPA).
2.3 ElGamal encryption
Assume uB and PB = uBP is a static key pair of Bob and
that Bob has published τB = ι
−1(PB). Alice wants to send
Bob a message M . To encrypt the message she performs the
following steps:
1. She generates a random integer r.
2. She computes the point R = rP . If R /∈ ι(S) she
repeats from step 1.
3. She computes ι−1(R) = τR.
4. She computes PB = ι(τB).
5. She computes the shared key value k = H(rPB).
6. She encrypts message m using key k: c = Enck(m).
7. She sends the tuple (τR, c) as an encryption of m.
To decrypt the received message, Bob:
1. computes ι(τR) = R,
2. computes the same shared key value: k = H(uBR),
and
3. decrypts the message: m = Deck(c).
ElGamal encryption also appears in [20] as an applica-
tion of an injective map between strings and curve points,
but our application is completely different from the applica-
tion in [20]. There is a critical difference in the underlying
encryption methods: we use symmetric cryptography to en-
crypt the message m using a key derived from rPB , whereas
[20] adds rPB to a curve point M that represents m. This
is exactly where [20] uses an injective map, namely to en-
code the string m as a curve point M . Note, however, that
this also (1) prevents [20] from encrypting long messages
and (2) allows malleability, in violation of the basic security
standards for public-key encryption. We instead use the
standard “KEM/DEM” structure to provide secure public-
key encryption, and as a consequence do not need to encode
strings as curve points. We use an injective map for a com-
pletely different reason: we encode curve points as strings,
preventing those points from being recognized by censors.
2.4 Short-term Diffie–Hellman keys
In this protocol, Alice and Bob agree on a shared secret
without using long-term keys. This protocol is important as
a way to provide forward secrecy. Of course, this provides
no authentication, but authentication can be added as a
subsequent layer.
1. Alice and Bob generate short-term keys as follows:
(a) Generate a random integer r.
(b) Compute point R = rP . If R /∈ ι(S) repeat from
step 1a.
2. Alice sends µA = ι
−1(RA) to Bob; Bob sends µB =
ι−1(RB) to Alice.
3. Alice decodes RB = ι(µB); Bob decodes RA = ι(µA).
4. Alice computes the shared key value k = H(rARB);
Bob computes the shared key value as k = H(rBRA).
2.5 Schnorr signatures
Assume that uB and PB = uBP are respectively private
and public keys of Bob, where PB ∈ ι(S) and Bob has pub-
lished τB = ι
−1(PB). To sign a message m, Bob performs
the following steps:
1. Choose a random integer r .
2. Compute R = rP . If R /∈ ι(S), repeat from step 1.
3. Compute τ = ι−1(R).
4. Compute h = H(R||m).
5. Compute s = r + huB (mod n).
6. The signature is the tuple ψ = (τ, s).
To have this signature resemble a random string the dis-
tribution of s must be indistinguishable from random, too.
This means that also n must be close to a power of 2. By
Hasse’s theorem, the number of points on E(Fq) is within
2
√
q of q. To detect a difference from random strings of the
same length about
√
q strings need to be inspected. Since
the security of the discrete logarithm on E is about
√
q this
does not pose any risk.
To verify the signature (τ, s), Alice has to perform the
following steps:
1. Compute PB = ι(τB).
2. Compute R = ι(τ).
3. Compute h = H(R||m).
4. Compare R + hPB and sP . If they are equal, accept.
Otherwise, reject.
Schnorr’s original signature system actually sent (h, s).
We follow“EdDSA”from [6] in sending an encoding of (R, s);
security is the same, since one can reconstruct (h, s) from
(R, s) and vice versa. The advantage of (R, s) is that it
allows batching, making signature verification about twice
as fast, as explained in [6]. Our use of ι makes this signature
indistinguishable from a uniform random string.
3. THE INJECTIVE MAP
Section 2 needs an injective map ι from a large set S of
strings to E(Fq). This section presents the mathematical
details: the construction of ι, how to compute ι, how to test
whether a curve point is in the image of ι, and how to invert ι
on curve points in the image. To help the reader visualize the
mathematical structure of ι we include a picture as Figure 1.
We impose certain requirements on q and E: we consider
only primes q; we require q to be congruent to 3 modulo 4;
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we require E to be a complete Edwards curve; and we impose
an extra algebraic requirement (c = 2/s2 in Theorem 1) that
allows only half of all complete Edwards curves. Approxi-
mately 1/16 of all isomorphism classes of elliptic curves over
all finite fields satisfy these requirements. (Asymptotically
100% of all finite fields, ordered by size, are prime fields;
50% of those primes are congruent to 3 modulo 4; 25% of el-
liptic curves over those fields are complete Edwards curves;
50% of those satisfy the extra algebraic requirement.) See
Section 4 for specific choices of q and E.
The heart of ι is a function φ : Fq → E(Fq) defined in
Theorem 1 and Definition 2. This function satisfies φ(t) =
φ(−t) for each t ∈ Fq but has no other collisions (see The-
orem 3), so its restriction to {0, 1, 2, . . . , (q − 1)/2} is injec-
tive. Theorem 4 simply defines S as {0, 1, 2, . . . , (q − 1)/2}
represented in little-endian form as b-bit strings, where
b = blog2 qc, and defines ι as the corresponding represen-
tation of φ. For indistinguishability we add the requirement
that (q + 1)/2 be extremely close to 2b.
As mentioned in Section 1, this function φ was introduced
by Fouque, Joux, and Tibouchi in [20]. Our main contribu-
tions in this section are a much more concise definition of
φ; much more direct proofs of the relevant properties of φ;
a simple method to invert φ; and a simple test for whether
a curve point is in the image of φ.
The function −φ has the same useful properties as φ. Our
choice of sign is not the same as the choice in [20]: in the no-
tation below, the ratio is χ(c), i.e., χ(2). This choice of sign
slightly simplifies our formulas for the forward and inverse
maps, although it is not the main simplification compared
to [20]. We also comment that φ(t) = −φ(1/t) for t 6= 0.
Computing ι in a sensible way is almost as fast as tra-
ditional point decompression, not a serious bottleneck com-
pared to scalar multiplication. Inverting ι is slightly slower,
but testing whether a curve point is in the image of ι is very
fast. See Section 3.5 for further performance analysis.
3.1 Squares, square roots, and χ
Before proving theorems we review the relevant properties
of squares in the finite field Fq, where q is a prime power
congruent to 3 modulo 4. In defining ι we consider only
primes q for simplicity (so that 0, 1, 2, . . . , (q − 1)/2 are dis-
tinct field elements) but our theorems about φ also apply to
prime powers.
Define χ : Fq → Fq by χ(a) = a(q−1)/2. If a is a non-zero
square then χ(a) = 1; if a is a non-square then χ(a) = −1;
if a = 0 then χ(a) = 0. Note that (q − 1)/2 is odd since
q ≡ 3 (mod 4), so χ(−1) = −1, so −1 is not a square. More
generally, χ(χ(a)) = χ(a). There are several easy ways to
manipulate χ arguments: for example, χ(ab) = χ(a)χ(b),
χ(1/a) = χ(a) = 1/χ(a) if a 6= 0, and χ(a2) = 1 if a 6= 0.
If a is a square then a(q+1)/4 is a square root of a: its
square is a(q+1)/2 = χ(a)a = a. More precisely, it is
the principal square root of a: the unique square root
that is itself a square. Any square root b of a satisfies
b = χ(b)a(q+1)/4.
The function χ is called a quadratic character. See [33]
for further background on finite fields.
3.2 The map
Theorem 1. Let q be a prime power congruent to 3 mod-
ulo 4. Let s be a nonzero element of Fq with (s
2−2)(s2+2) 6=
0. Define c = 2/s2. Then c(c− 1)(c+ 1) 6= 0.
Figure 1: The structure of our encoding function
ι−1, a bijection from a large subset of E(Fq) to a
large set S of b-bit strings. The elliptic curve E is
required to be a complete Edwards curve, shown on
the left together with a sample element P = (x, y)
of E(Fq). A sample b-bit output is shown on the
right. See Theorem 1, Definition 2, Theorem 3, and
Theorem 4 for further details regarding the function
in the middle.
Define r = c + 1/c and d = −(c + 1)2/(c − 1)2. Then
r 6= 0, and d is not a square.
The following elements of Fq are defined for each t ∈ Fq \
{±1}:
u = (1− t)/(1 + t),
v = u5 + (r2 − 2)u3 + u,
X = χ(v)u,
Y = (χ(v)v)(q+1)/4χ(v)χ
(
u2 + 1/c2
)
,
x = (c− 1)sX(1 +X)/Y,
y = (rX − (1 +X)2)/(rX + (1 +X)2).
Furthermore x2 + y2 = 1 + dx2y2; uvXY x(y + 1) 6= 0; and
Y 2 = X5 + (r2 − 2)X3 +X.
Proof. c(c − 1)(c + 1) 6= 0: By definition c = 2/s2
so c 6= 0. By hypothesis s2 6= 2 and s2 6= −2 so c 6= 1 and
c 6= −1.
r 6= 0: If r = 0 then c = −1/c so c2 = −1, contradiction.
d is not a square: Otherwise −1 = d(c− 1)2/(c+ 1)2 is
a square, contradiction.
u is defined and u 6= 0: By hypothesis 1 + t 6= 0 and
1− t 6= 0.
v 6= 0: r2− 2 = c2 + 1/c2 so v = u(u2 + c2)(u2 + 1/c2). If
v = 0 then there are three possibilities: u = 0, contradiction;
or u2+c2 = 0 so −1 = (u/c)2, contradiction; or u2+1/c2 = 0
so −1 = (uc)2, contradiction.
XY 6= 0, so x is defined: As above u2 + 1/c2 6= 0 so
all factors in X and Y are nonzero.
1 + X 6= 0, so x 6= 0: If X = −1 then u = −χ(v)
so v = −χ(v)(1 + r2 − 2 + 1) = −χ(v)r2 so χ(v) = −χ(v),
contradiction.
(X,Y ) satisfies Y 2 = X5 + (r2 − 2)X3 + X: X =
χ(v)u so X5 +(r2−2)X3 +X = χ(v)(u5 +(r2−2)u3 +u) =
χ(v)v. Also χ(v)v is a square so (χ(v)v)(q+1)/2 = χ(v)v so
Y 2 = χ(v)v.
rX+(1+X)2 6= 0, so y is defined: If rX = −(1+X)2
then (r2 + 4r)X2 = X4 − 2X2 + 1 so
Y 2 = X(X4 + (r2 − 2)X2 + 1) = X3(2r2 + 4r)
= rX ·X2(2r + 4) = −(1 +X)2X2(s+ 2/s)2
so −1 is a square, contradiction.
y + 1 6= 0: If y = −1 then (rX − (1 +X)2)/(rX + (1 +
X)2) = −1 so rX−(1+X)2 = −(rX+(1+X)2) so rX = 0,
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contradiction.
x2 + y2 = 1 +dx2y2: First (c− 1)2s2 = (c− 1)2(2/c) =
2(r − 2) so
Y 2(1− x2) = Y 2 − (c− 1)2s2X2(1 +X)2
= X5 + (r2 − 2)X3 +X − 2(r − 2)X2(1 +X)2
= X(rX − (1 +X)2)2.
Similarly −d = (c+ 2 + 1/c)/(c− 2 + 1/c) = (r+ 2)/(r− 2)
so −d(c− 1)2s2 = 2(r + 2) so
Y 2(1− dx2) = Y 2 − d(c− 1)2s2X2(1 +X)2
= X5 + (r2 − 2)X3 +X + 2(r + 2)X2(1 +X)2
= X(rX + (1 +X)2)2.
Note that Y 2(1−dx2) 6= 0, and divide: (1−x2)/(1−dx2) =
(rX − (1 + X)2)2/(rX + (1 + X)2)2 = y2; i.e., x2 + y2 =
1 + dx2y2.
Definition 2. In the situation of Theorem 1, the decod-
ing function for the complete Edwards curve E : x2 +y2 =
1+dx2y2 is the function φ : Fq → E(Fq) defined as follows:
φ(±1) = (0, 1); if t /∈ {±1} then φ(t) = (x, y).
3.3 Inverting the map
Theorem 3. In the situation of Definition 2:
1. If t ∈ Fq then the set of preimages of φ(t) under φ is
{t,−t}.
2. φ(Fq) is the set of (x, y) ∈ E(Fq) such that
• y + 1 6= 0;
• (1+ηr)2−1 is a square, where η = y − 1
2(y + 1)
; and
• if ηr = −2 then x = 2s(c− 1)χ(c)/r.
3. If (x, y) ∈ φ(Fq) then the following elements X¯, z, u¯, t¯
of Fq are defined and φ(t¯) = (x, y):
X¯ = −(1 + ηr) + ((1 + ηr)2 − 1)(q+1)/4,
z = χ
(
(c− 1)sX¯(1 + X¯)x(X¯2 + 1/c2)),
u¯ = zX¯,
t¯ = (1− u¯)/(1 + u¯).
Proof. Statement 1 of the theorem has two parts: a for-
ward statement φ(t) = φ(−t), and a reverse statement that
there are no other preimages. Statement 2 also has two
parts: a forward statement that any (x, y) ∈ φ(Fq) satisfies
certain conditions, and a reverse statement that any element
of E(Fq) satisfying those conditions is in φ(Fq). We orga-
nize the proof as (A) forward 1; (B) 3, forward 2, and reverse
1; (C) reverse 2.
A. Fix t ∈ Fq. We now show that φ(t) = φ(−t). This is
the forward part of statement 1 in the theorem.
If t ∈ {±1} then φ(t) = (0, 1) and φ(−t) = (0, 1) by
definition, so φ(t) = φ(−t). Assume from now on that t /∈
{±1}.
Define u, v,X, Y, x, y from t as in Theorem 1. Then φ(t) =
(x, y) by definition.
Put t′ = −t, and define u′, v′, X ′, Y ′, x′, y′ the same way
from t′. Then φ(t′) = (x′, y′). The proof strategy is to
compare successively u′ to u, v′ to v, etc., concluding that
x′ = x and y′ = y.
u′ = (1− t′)/(1 + t′) = (1 + t)/(1− t) = 1/u.
v′ = u′5 + (r2 − 2)u′3 + u′ = 1
u5
+ (r2 − 2) 1
u3
+ 1
u
, so
v′u6 = u + (r2 − 2)u3 + u5 = v; i.e., v′ = v/u6. Note that
χ(v′) = χ(v) since χ(u6) = 1.
X′ = χ(v′)u′ = χ(v)/u = 1/(χ(v)u) = 1/X since χ(v) =
1/χ(v).
y′ =
rX ′−(1+X ′)2
rX ′+(1+X ′)2
=
r 1
X
−(1+ 1
X
)2
r 1
X
+(1+ 1
X
)2
=
rX−(X+1)2
rX+(X+1)2
= y.
Y ′ = (χ(v′)v′)(q+1)/4χ(v′)χ
(
u′2 + 1/c2
)
. This takes the
most work; the first and third factors each need careful anal-
yses. The second factor is easy: χ(v′) = χ(v) as above.
First factor: χ(v′)v′ = χ(v)v/u6. Note that the product
χ(u)u3 is a square and is therefore the principal square root
of u6; i.e., (u6)(q+1)/4 = χ(u)u3. Hence (χ(v′)v′)(q+1)/4 =
(χ(v)v/u6)(q+1)/4 = (χ(v)v)(q+1)/4χ(u)/u3.
Third factor: Recall that v = u(u2 + c2)(u2 + 1/c2) and
that χ(a) = χ(ab2) for any b 6= 0. Thus
χ
(
u′2 + 1/c2
)
= χ
(
c2u4(u′2 + 1/c2)(u2 + 1/c2)2
)
= χ
(
u2(c2 + u2)(u2 + 1/c2)2
)
= χ
(
uv(u2 + 1/c2)
)
.
Now multiply to obtain Y ′ = Y χ(u)χ(uv)/u3 =
Y/(χ(v)u)3 = Y/X3.
Finally
x′ = (c− 1)sX ′(1 +X ′)/Y ′ = (c− 1)s 1
X
(
1 +
1
X
)/
Y
X3
= (c− 1)sX(1 +X)/Y = x.
Hence φ(−t) = (x′, y′) = (x, y) = φ(t) as claimed.
B. Fix t ∈ Fq, and define (x, y) = φ(t). We show that
X¯, z, u¯, t¯ in the theorem are defined and that t¯ ∈ {t,−t}, so
φ(t¯) = (x, y); this is statement 3 in the theorem. We also
show the forward part of statement 2: namely, y + 1 6= 0;
(1+ηr)2−1 is a square, where η = (y−1)/(2(y+1)); and if
ηr = −2 then x = 2s(c−1)χ(c)/r. We also show the reverse
part of statement 1: there are no preimages of φ(t) other
than t and −t.
The definition of φ has two cases: if t ∈ {1,−1} then
(x, y) = (0, 1); if t /∈ {1,−1} then u, v,X, Y, x, y are defined
in Theorem 1. Note that in the second case x 6= 0 by Theo-
rem 1, so in particular t is not a preimage of (0, 1).
In the first case y + 1 = 2 6= 0; η = 0; (1 + ηr)2 − 1 = 0
is a square; X¯ = −1; z = 0; u¯ = 0; and t¯ = 1 ∈ {t,−t}. As
noted above, 1 and −1 are the only preimages of (0, 1).
What remains is the second case. Here y + 1 6= 0 by
Theorem 1. The equation y = (rX − (1 + X)2)/(rX +
(1 + X)2) implies X2 + (2 + r(y − 1)/(y + 1))X + 1 = 0,
i.e., X2 + 2(1 + ηr)X + 1 = 0. Note that this forces the
discriminant 4(1 + ηr)2− 4 to be a square; i.e., (1 + ηr)2− 1
is a square. Divide by X to see that X+ 1/X = −2(1 +ηr).
If ηr = −2 then (X − 1)2 = 0 so X = 1 so u ∈ {±1};
the case u = −1 forces 1 − t = −(1 + t), contradiction, so
u = 1 and t = 0; so v = r2, so Y = (r2)(q+1)/4χ(1 + 1/c2) =
χ(r)rχ(r/c) = rχ(c), so x = 2(c − 1)sχ(c)/r as claimed;
also note for future reference that y = (r − 4)/(r + 4), i.e.,
φ(0) = (2(c− 1)sχ(c)/r, (r − 4)/(r + 4)).
Define t′ = −t, and define u′, v′, X ′, Y ′, x′, y′ as in Part A
of this proof. Then X ′ = 1/X, so X +X ′ = −2(1 + ηr).
By construction 1+ηr+X¯ is a square root of (1+ηr)2−1;
i.e., X¯2 + 2(1 + ηr)X¯ + 1 = 0. Now (X¯ − X)(X¯ − X ′) =
X¯2 − (X + X ′)X¯ + XX ′ = X¯2 + 2(1 + ηr)X¯ + 1 = 0 so
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X¯ = X or X¯ = X ′. This forces u¯ = u or u¯ = u′, since the
definition of z turns out to match χ(v) and χ(v′):
• If X¯ = X then (c − 1)sX¯(1 + X¯) = xY so
z = χ
(
x2Y (X2 + 1/c2)
)
= χ(Y )χ
(
X2 + 1/c2
)
. Note
that (χ(v)v)(q+1)/4 is a square and χ
(
u2 + 1/c2
)
=
χ
(
X2 + 1/c2
)
, so χ(Y ) = χ(v)χ(X2 + 1/c2), so z =
χ(v), so u¯ = χ(v)X = u, so t¯ = t.
• If X¯ = X ′ then similarly z = χ(v′), u¯ = u′, and
t¯ = t′ = −t.
To summarize, t¯ ∈ {t,−t}, so φ(t¯) = (x, y).
The same logic also shows that there are no preimages p
of (x, y) except for t and −t. Indeed, if (x, y) = φ(p) then
substituting p for t in the same proof shows that t¯ ∈ {p,−p},
so p ∈ {t¯,−t¯} = {t,−t}.
C. Fix (x, y) ∈ E(Fq). Assume that y + 1 6= 0; that
(1 + ηr)2 − 1 is a square, where η = (y − 1)/(2(y + 1)); and
that if ηr = −2 then x = 2s(c − 1)χ(c)/r. We now show
that (x, y) ∈ φ(Fq). This is the reverse part of statement 2
of the theorem.
If x = 0 then (x, y) = (0,±1) from the curve equation;
but y + 1 6= 0, so (x, y) = (0, 1) = φ(1) ∈ φ(Fq) as claimed.
Assume from now on that x 6= 0.
If y = 1 then x = 0 from the curve equation, contradiction.
Hence y 6= 1; i.e., η 6= 0.
Define X = −(1 + ηr) + ((1 + ηr)2 − 1)(q+1)/4. As above
1+ηr+X is a square root of (1+ηr)2−1, soX2+2(1+ηr)X+
1 = 0. This quadratic equation has several consequences.
First, X 6= 0. Second, rX + (1 + X)2 6= 0: otherwise sub-
tract to see that (1−2η)rX = 0, so 1 = 2η, so y−1 = y+1,
contradiction. Third, X 6= −1: otherwise η = 0, contradic-
tion. Fourth, y = (rX − (1 +X)2)/(rX + (1 +X)2).
If X = 1 then y = (r − 4)/(r + 4); also ηr = −2 so by
assumption x = 2s(c − 1)χ(c)/r so (x, y) = φ(0) ∈ φ(Fq).
Assume from now on that X 6= 1.
Observe that
(rX + (1 +X)2)2(1− y2)
= (rX + (1 +X)2)2 − (rX − (1 +X)2)2
= 4rX(1 +X)2.
Recall that −d = (r + 2)/(r − 2) and similarly observe that
(rX + (1 +X)2)2(1− dy2)
= (rX + (1 +X)2)2 +
r + 2
r − 2(rX − (1 +X)
2)2
= (2r/(r − 2))(X4 + (r2 − 2)X2 + 1).
Note that 1− dy2 6= 0 since d is not a square. Divide:
x2 =
1− y2
1− dy2 =
2(r − 2)X2(1 +X)2
X5 + (r2 − 2)X3 +X .
Define Y = (c− 1)sX(1 +X)/x. Then
Y 2 = (c− 1)2s2X2(1 +X)2/x2
= 2(r − 2)X2(1 +X)2/x2
= X5 + (r2 − 2)X3 +X.
Define z = χ
(
Y (X2 + 1/c2)
)
. Both Y and X2 + 1/c2 are
nonzero, so z ∈ {±1}.
Define u = zX. Then u ∈ {±X}. Note that u 6= −1,
since X /∈ {±1}.
Define v = u5 + (r2 − 2)u3 + u. Then v = z(X5 +
(r2 − 2)X3 + X) = zY 2, so χ(v) = χ(z) = z. Hence
X = χ(v)u and Y 2 = χ(v)v. Furthermore χ(v) =
z = χ
(
Y (X2 + 1/c2)
)
= χ
(
Y (u2 + 1/c2)
)
, so χ(Y ) =
χ(v)χ
(
u2 + 1/c2
)
, so Y = (χ(v)v)(q+1)/4χ(v)χ
(
u2 + 1/c2
)
.
Finally define t = (1−u)/(1+u). Then t /∈ {±1} and u =
(1− t)/(1+ t). The formulas for u, v,X, Y, x, y in Theorem 1
are all satisfied, so (x, y) = φ(t) ∈ φ(Fq) as claimed.
3.4 Encoding as strings
Theorem 4. In the situation of Definition 2, assume
that q is prime, and define b = blog2 qc. Define σ :
{0, 1}b → Fq by σ(τ0, τ1, . . . , τb−1) =
∑
i τi2
i. Define
S = σ−1({0, 1, 2, . . . , (q − 1)/2}). Define ι : S → E(Fq)
as follows: ι(τ) = φ(σ(τ)). Then #S = (q + 1)/2; ι is an
injective map from S to E(Fq); and ι(S) = φ(Fq).
Proof. First 2b ≤ q so the integers 0, 1, . . . , 2b − 1 are
distinct in Fq; hence σ is injective. Furthermore 2
b > q/2 so
{0, 1, . . . , (q − 1)/2} is a subset of {0, 1, . . . , 2b − 1}; hence
each of 0, 1, . . . , (q−1)/2 has a preimage under σ, and S has
exactly (q + 1)/2 elements.
If ι(τ) = ι(τ ′) then φ(σ(τ)) = φ(σ(τ ′)), so σ(τ) =
±σ(τ ′) by Theorem 3; but σ(τ) and σ(τ ′) are both in
{0, 1, . . . , (q − 1)/2}, so σ(τ) = σ(τ ′), so τ = τ ′. Hence ι
is injective.
Each element of ι(S) has the form φ(σ(τ)) and is therefore
in φ(Fq). Conversely, if P ∈ φ(Fq) then P = φ(t) for some
t ∈ Fq, so also P = φ(−t) by Theorem 3. At least one
of t,−t is in {0, 1, . . . , (q − 1)/2}, i.e., in σ(S), so P is in
φ(σ(S)) = ι(S).
3.5 Performance analysis
The definitions of u, v,X, Y, x, y in Theorem 1 involve di-
visions by 1 + t, c, Y , and rX + (1 + X)2. The reciprocal
of c is trivially precomputed, and the other divisions are
easily replaced by a few multiplications: one simply stores
field elements as fractions, i.e., works in projective coordi-
nates. There are several easy ways to reduce the number of
multiplications: for example, factor u5 + (r2 − 2)u3 + u as
u(u2 + c2)(u2 + 1/c2), and reuse u2 + 1/c2 in computing Y .
The main bottlenecks are then the following expo-
nentiations: computing χ(v) (used repeatedly); comput-
ing χ
(
u2 + 1/c2
)
; computing (χ(v)v)(q+1)/4, the principal
square root of χ(v)v; and computing a final division if the
output (x, y) is needed in affine coordinates instead of pro-
jective coordinates. The only essential exponentiation is for
the square-root computation: the χ computations and divi-
sion can use Euclid’s algorithm (blinded to protect against
timing attacks) rather than exponentiation.
Similar comments apply to inverting φ (or ι). There is
one essential exponentiation, the square-root computation
to obtain X¯ in Theorem 3. There are also two exponentia-
tions that can be replaced by Euclidean computations: one
χ computation to obtain z, and one division to obtain the
final output t¯. Fractions eliminate the initial division by
2(y+ 1), but fractions cannot be used for t¯, since the goal is
to obtain the unique string representing t¯.
It is easier to test, given (x, y) ∈ Fq × Fq, whether
(x, y) ∈ φ(Fq) (i.e., whether (x, y) ∈ ι(S)) without in-
verting φ. One first checks x2 + y2 = 1 + dx2y2 to ver-
ify (x, y) ∈ E(Fq), if this is not already known. Then, by
Theorem 3, (x, y) ∈ φ(Fq) if and only if the following three
conditions are satisfied:
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• y + 1 6= 0;
• (1 + ηr)2− 1 is a square, where η = (y− 1)/(2(y+ 1));
i.e., r(y − 1)(r(y − 1) + 4(y + 1)) is a square;
• if ηr = −2 (equivalently, if r(y− 1) = −4(y+ 1)) then
x = 2s(c− 1)χ(c)/r.
This requires a few multiplications and one χ computation.
4. CONSTRUCTION OF A SUITABLE EL-
LIPTIC CURVE
This section introduces Curve1174, a high-security high-
speed elliptic curve that supports the injective map pre-
sented in Section 3. In particular, this section specifies
Curve1174; presents the criteria that we used to construct
Curve1174; and analyzes the extent to which various previ-
ous curves meet the same criteria.
4.1 The curve
Curve1174 is the Edwards curve x2 + y2 = 1 − 1174x2y2
over the field Fq, where q is the prime number 2
251−9. The
coefficient −1174 is a non-square in Fq, so Curve1174 is a
complete Edwards curve by [7, Theorem 3.3]: the sum of
any two points (x1, y1) and (x2, y2) in Curve1174(Fq) is(
x1y2 + y1x2
1− 1174x1x2y1y2 ,
y1y2 − x1x2
1 + 1174x1x2y1y2
)
,
with no divisions by 0 and no exceptional cases. The neutral
element of the curve is (0, 1).
To see that we have the desired injective map, note that
q is congruent to 3 modulo 4; define s as the element
18064941211227179925228040535007972296
48438766985538871240722010849934886421
of Fq (split onto two lines here for readability); define c =
2/s2; and define d = −(c + 1)2/(c − 1)2. Then d = −1174.
The Edwards curve in Theorem 1 and Definition 2, for this
choice of (q, s), is exactly Curve1174.
Curve1174 is birationally equivalent to the Montgomery
curve (4/1175)V 2 = U3+(4/1175−2)U2+U by [7, Theorem
3.2]. The leading coefficient 4/1175 is a non-square in Fq,
so V 2 = U3 + (4/1175− 2)U2 + U is a nontrivial quadratic
twist of this curve. The Sage computer-algebra system [41]
counts points on this curve in under 10 seconds on a laptop
using the following script:
q=2^251-9
E=EllipticCurve(GF(q),[0,4/1175-2,0,1,0])
print E.trace_of_frobenius()
# output -45330879683285730139092453152713398836
The number of points on the twist is thus q + 1 + t, and
the number of points on Curve1174 is q + 1 − t, where t =
45330879683285730139092453152713398836. These integers
q+ 1 + t, q+ 1− t have the form 4p0, 4p1 respectively, where
p0 and p1 are primes close to 2
249. Generic methods to
compute a discrete logarithm on Curve1174 or its twist take
approximately
√
pi2247 ≈ 2124.3 group operations on average.
The point (U, V ) = (4, 192257776421116702304087124422
05514783403012708409058383774613284963344096) on the
Montgomery curve (4/1175)V 2 = U3 + (4/1175− 2)U2 +U
has order 4p1. The corresponding point on Curve1174 is
(x, y) = (4/V, 3/5).
Curve1174 and its twist do not have any structure al-
lowing fast pairings or other special approaches to com-
puting discrete logarithms. The primes p0 and p1 do not
equal the field characteristic q. The order of q modulo
p0 is not small: it is (p0 − 1)/2. The order of q modulo
p1 is not small: it is p1 − 1. The endomorphism ring of
Curve1174 has a large discriminant: up to squares this dis-
criminant equals t2−4q, which is divisible once by the prime
161567415114024992333870349255799, so the discriminant
must be a multiple of this prime.
4.2 Design criteria
We consider only prime fields. Bernstein, citing subfield
attacks from [25] and [15], wrote in [4] that prime fields“have
the virtue of minimizing the number of security concerns
for elliptic-curve cryptography”; see [19] and [38] for recent
developments of the attack strategy from [15]. Similarly,
the Brainpool standard [11] and NSA’s Suite B standards
[32] require prime-field ECC. There is general agreement
that prime fields are the safe, conservative choice for ECC.
Prime fields also perform very well across a wide range of
processors; the current ECC speed records on high-end Intel
processors take advantage of special Intel support for binary
fields (see [37]), but most CPUs do not have any comparable
support.
We consider only primes q congruent to 3 modulo 4. This
is required for the injective map. These primes also have
the well-known benefit of allowing very simple square-root
computations; most other primes allow square-root compu-
tations at about the same speed but with more complicated
methods.
We consider only complete Edwards curves, i.e., curves
x2 + y2 = 1 + dx2y2 where d is not a square. This is re-
quired for the injective map. About 25% of all elliptic curves
over Fq are expressible as complete Edwards curves, as men-
tioned in [7, Abstract] and experimentally verified in [5, Sec-
tion 4]. Complete Edwards curves also have the advantages
of being extremely fast and of allowing a single addition for-
mula with no exceptions. Complete Edwards curves are also
expressible as Montgomery curves supporting very fast and
uniform Montgomery-ladder computations.
To protect against generic discrete-logarithm algorithms
we impose the standard requirement of a large prime divid-
ing the number of curve points. This forces q to be even
larger, where the gap accounts for the cofactor: the number
of curve points divided by this prime. To minimize the per-
formance problems of a large q we consider only Edwards
curves with minimal cofactor, namely 4. The number of
curve points is 4 times a prime for slightly below 1% of all
choices of d, for the size of q that we consider below.
We also impose the requirement of“twist security”: a large
prime dividing the number of points on the quadratic twist
of the curve. This prevents “twist attacks” against protocols
that use the “Montgomery ladder” without checking that
incoming points are on the curve; [4, Section 3] says that
this defense was proposed by Bernstein in 2001. For q ≡ 3
(mod 4) roughly 1/10000 of all choices of d have the number
of points on the curve and the number of points on the twist
each being 4 times a prime.
We require d to have the form −(c + 1)2/(c − 1)2 with
c = 2/s2. This is required for the injective map. For q ≡ 3
(mod 4) about half of all non-squares d are expressible in
this way.
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For standard performance reasons we take q very close to,
but not above, a power of 2. The primes q ≡ 3 (mod 4)
within 32 of 2e for 200 ≤ e ≤ 300 are 2206 − 5, 2212 − 29,
2226 − 5, 2243 − 9, 2251 − 9, and 2285 − 9. Note that these
fields ensure that σ−1 covers nearly all of
{
0, 1, . . . , 2b − 1}
giving a very close to uniform distribution of the encoding
function. We focus on the last two of these primes as pro-
viding quantitatively safe security levels, and choose 2251−9
as being obviously faster.
Some Edwards-curve operations involve multiplications by
d. To speed up these multiplications we take the smallest
possible d in absolute value, subject to the other require-
ments. The choice d = −1174 for q = 2251 − 9 is smaller
than expected.
4.3 Previous curves over prime fields
There is a long history of specific elliptic curves being de-
signed to meet various security and performance criteria.
For example, almost fifteen years ago the IEEE P1363 stan-
dard [30, Sections A.9–A.12]
• specified curves y2 = x3−3x+b to “provide the fastest
arithmetic on elliptic curves”;
• imposed various further conditions upon these curves,
with the security goal of making discrete logarithms
difficult to compute; and
• specified a procedure to generate “verifiably pseudo-
random” curves meeting these conditions.
NIST’s standard curves P-192, P-224, P-256, P-384, and P-
521 were generated as follows: five particular prime fields
were chosen with the goal of maximizing performance; the
IEEE P1363 procedure was used to generate one curve over
each of those fields.
Subsequent research developed new security and perfor-
mance criteria for curves over prime fields: twist secu-
rity, Montgomery compatibility, Edwards compatibility, and
completeness. The NIST curves, unsurprisingly, flunk these
criteria: choosing cofactor 1 for y2 = x3−3x+b is incompat-
ible with both Montgomery and Edwards, and one cannot
expect twist security if it is not demanded in advance. Newer
curves meet all of these criteria: for example, Curve25519
was explicitly designed for twist security and Montgomery
compatibility, and was shown in [7] to also be expressible as
a complete Edwards curve.
These extra criteria do not improve discrete-logarithm se-
curity, but they do improve real-world security. These cri-
teria allow the simplest implementations to be correct im-
plementations, whereas for other curves the simplest imple-
mentations that seem to work actually have hidden flaws
that compromise security. See, e.g., [9, Section 4.1], [31],
and [21].
We are imposing a new security condition to support cen-
sorship circumvention: namely, an efficient way to encode a
large fraction of all curve points as strings indistinguishable
from uniform random strings. It is easy to imagine how this
condition could be accidentally met by previously generated
curves:
• The advantages of complete Edwards curves have been
well known for five years.
• The advantages of Montgomery curves have been well
known for even longer. A random Montgomery curve
has a good chance of being expressible as a complete
Edwards curve; see [5, Section 4].
• All complete Edwards curves over Fq for q ≡ 3
(mod 4) meet the new security condition. Half of these
curves are within the streamlined case expressed by
Theorem 1.
Given the amount of performance optimization of
Curve25519 (see [4], [26], [14], [6], and [8]) and the wide
deployment of Curve25519 in several applications (see, e.g.,
[2]) we were hoping that this condition would be met by
Curve25519. However, our approach to encoding is clearly
limited to q ≡ 3 (mod 4), while Curve25519 is defined over
Fq with q ≡ 1 (mod 4).
We would expect serious implementations of Curve1174 to
be competitive in speed with Curve25519. (Curve1174 has
some small advantages: for example, 2251 − 9 is closer to a
power of 2 than 2255−19 is, and 1174 is considerably smaller
than 486662. On the other hand, Curve25519 also has a
small advantage: it is expressible in “−1-twisted Edwards
form”, allowing the speedup explained in [28].) The critical
advantage of Curve1174 is the injective map presented in
Section 3.
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APPENDIX
A. PYTHON IMPLEMENTATION
The following Python script contains reference implemen-
tations of ι and ι−1, illustrated for a 6-bit encoding of 64
different points on a complete Edwards curve over F127.
q = 127
s = 37
def expmod(b,e,m):
if e == 0: return 1
t = expmod(b,e/2,m)**2 % m
if e & 1: t = (t*b) % m
return t
def inv(x):
return expmod(x,q-2,q)
def chi(x):
return expmod(x,(q-1)/2,q)
def issquare(x):
return chi(x) == 1 or chi(x) == 0
def sqrt(x):
return expmod(x,(q+1)/4,q)
b = 1
while 1<<(b+1) <= q: b = b + 1
c = (2*inv(s*s)) % q
r = (c+inv(c)) % q
d = (-(c+1)*(c+1)*inv((c-1)*(c-1))) % q
def decode(tau):
# simple reference implementation of iota
t = sum(tau[i]<<i for i in range(b))
if t > (q-1)/2: return
if t == 1: return (0,1)
u = ((1-t)*inv(1+t)) % q
v = (u*(u*u+c*c)*(u*u+inv(c*c))) % q
X = (chi(v)*u) % q
Y = (sqrt(chi(v)*v)*chi(v)*chi(u*u+inv(c*c))) % q
x = ((c-1)*s*X*(1+X)*inv(Y)) % q
y = ((r*X-(1+X)*(1+X))*inv(r*X+(1+X)*(1+X))) % q
return (x,y)
def encode(P):
# simple reference implementation of iota^(-1)
x,y = P
if (x*x+y*y-1-d*x*x*y*y) % q != 0: return
if (y+1) % q == 0: return
eta = ((y-1)*inv(2*(y+1))) % q
if not issquare((1+eta*r)*(1+eta*r)-1): return
if (eta*r+2) % q == 0:
if (x-2*s*(c-1)*chi(c)*inv(r)) % q != 0: return
X = (-(1+eta*r)+sqrt((1+eta*r)*(1+eta*r)-1)) % q
z = chi((c-1)*s*X*(1+X)*x*(X*X+inv(c*c)))
u = (z*X) % q
t = ((1-u)*inv(1+u)) % q
if t > (q-1)/2: t = q - t
return tuple([(t >> i) & 1 for i in range(b)])
def checkencoding():
numpoints = 0
for t in range(1<<b):
tau = tuple([(t >> i) & 1 for i in range(b)])
P = decode(tau)
if P:
numpoints += 1
if encode(P) != tau:
raise Exception("encoding fails")
if numpoints != (q+1)/2:
raise Exception("wrong number of points")
for x in range(q):
for y in range(q):
if (x*x+y*y-1-d*x*x*y*y) % q == 0:
P = (x,y)
tau = encode(P)
if tau:
if decode(tau) != P:
raise Exception("decoding fails")
def printencoding():
for t in range(1<<b):
tau = tuple([(t >> i) & 1 for i in range(b)])
print tau,decode(tau)
checkencoding()
printencoding()
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